Another Primary Innovator in Islam
by GF Haddad ©
[With a list of his labelling muslims]
[With a list of his tampering of the scholarly heritage]
[How sunni scholars have always defined innovation (bid`a) in religion]
`Abd al-`Aziz ibn `Abd Allah Ibn Baz, the late (d. 1999) nescient mufti of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, government scholar par excellence, and major innovator whose influence on spreading deviant beliefs is incalculable. The present crippling of Islam and Muslims took place under his leadership and as a direct result of his policies as listed by Sayyid Yusuf al-Rifa`i in his Nasiha li Ikhwanina `Ulama' Najd ("Advice to Our Brothers the Scholars of Najd" 
): * Calling the Muslims "Pagans" * Calling the Muslims "Apostates"
* Calling the Muslims "Deviants"
* Calling the Muslims "Innovators"
* Monopolozing Teaching in Hijaz
* Falsifying Our Scholarly Heritage (see below)
* Libeling Ulema Who Disagreed with Wahhabi Doctrine
* Imposting the Style of Najd in Adhân
* Shutting the Mosque in Madina at Night
* Posting Hoodlums at the Noble Grave
* Obstructing and Scolding Women in Madina
* Blocking Women from Visiting Baqi`
* Police Interrogation Centers
* Razing of the Mosque of Abu Bakr -riDiaLLahu 'anhu -
* Razing of Abu Ayyub al-Ansari's House
* Destroying Historical Makka and Madina but Preserving Khaybar
* Replacing Khadija's House with Latrines
* Outlawing Nasiha to Rulers
* Interdiction of Dala'il al-Khayrat and other books
* Forbidding Mawlid Gatherings
* Etc.
As former overall president of the Directorships of Scholarly Research, Iftâ', Da`wa, and Irshâd, Ibn Baz is on record for issuing a fatwa declaring as unislamic the Palestinian people's uprising against the Jewish State of Israel, whereas he never condemned the practices, in his own country, of gambling, horse-racing, and usury. In the late sixties he declared any and all forms of cooperation with the kuffâr prohibited and cast a judgment of apostasy on `Abd al-Nasir for employing a civilian force of a few hundred Russian engineers to build the Aswan dam. In the early nineties he again made it halâl for kufr forces to come, under their flag and sovereignty, in hundred of thousands, to occupy Muslim lands and destroy Iraq, because of "necessity." There was also no problem for them to stay after the "necessity" was over.
In his infamous al-Adilla al-Naqliyya wa al-Hissiyya `ala Jarayan al-Shamsi wa Sukuni al-Ard ("The Transmitted and Sensory Proofs of the Rotation of the Sun and Stillness of the Earth"), he asserted that the earth was flat and disk-like and that the sun revolved around it.
Like all the anthropomorphists of his School, Ibn Baz added modifiers to the Divine Attributes, asserting, for example, that Allah Most High and Exalted "istawâ `alâ al-`arsh haqqan" - variously translated as "He established Himself over the Throne in person" or "actually" or "literally" - haqqan being an innovated addition which violates the practice of the true Salaf consisting in asserting the Divine Attributes bilâ kayf - without "how" - any modifier being by definition a modality. What is worse, of course, is that such an innovated addition is an avenue to anthropomorphism.
In his footnote to article 38 of Imam al-Tahawi's `Aqida
("He is beyond having limits placed on Him, or being restricted, or having parts or limbs. Nor is He contained by the six directions as all created entities are"), he asserts, "Allah is beyond limits that we know but has limits He knows." This is, like haqqan, a true innovation of misguidance and innovated phrase as stated by al-Dhahabi and others, utterly unsupported by the Qur'an, the Sunna, and the Consensus, and violating the practice of the true Salaf who refrained from indulging in speculations of modality whenever they mentioned the Divine Attributes. (This footnote also appears in Shu`ayb Hassan's translation in English, which also contains other major doctrinal errors.)Ibn Baz's Najdi friends commit the same ugly innovation: `Abd Allah al-Hashidi in his edition of al-Bayhaqi's al-Asma' wa al-Sifat - written in rebuttal of al-Kawthari's landmark edition - states: "As for us we affirm a form (sûra) for Allah unlike forms," while al-Albani in his Sharh approvingly quotes Muhammad ibn Mani`'s remonstration of Imam al-Tahawi for this particular article and his pretense that the Imam, perhaps, did not write it in the first place: "The Imam and author was in no need at all for these invented, wrongly suggestive words, and if someone were to say that they are interpolated and not his own words, I would not think it improbable, so as to keep a good opinion of him"!1
Ibn Baz also suggests corporal limbs for Allah Most High and Exalted in his statement in Taliqat Hamma `ala ma Katabahu al-Shaykh Muhammad `Ali al-Sabuni fi Sifat Allah ("Important Comments on What Shaykh al-Sabuni Wrote Concerning the Divine Attributes") that "To declare Allah transcendent beyond possessing body (al-jism), pupils (al-hadaqa), auditory meatus (al-simâkh), tongue (al-lisân), and larynx (al-hanjara) is not the position of Ahl al-Sunna but rather that of the scholars of condemned kalâm and their contrivance."2
By his phrase "the scholars of condemned kalâm" he disparages Ibn Khafif, Ibn `Abd al-Salam, Ibn al-Juwayni, Ibn Hibban, Ibn `Arabi, al-Ghazzali, al-Razi, al-Qadi `Iyad, al-Maziri, al-Nawawi, al-Pazdawi, al-Bayhaqi, al-Qurtubi, al-Khatib, Ibn al-Jawzi, Ibn Daqiq al-`Id, Ibn Hajar al-`Asqalani, Shah Wali Allah, the entire Ash`ari and Maturidi Schools and, lately, al-Sabuni, all of whom asserted transcendence in similar terms. As Ibn Hajar stated in Fath al-Bari: "The elite of the mutakallimûn said: `He knows not Allah, who attributes to Him resemblance to His creation, or attributes a hand to Him, or a son."3 Contrary to this the doctrine of the Literalists consists in attributing an actual hand to the Creator. But Ibn Baz in his notes on Fath al-Bari charges al-Qadi `Iyad and Ibn Hajar with abandoning the way of Ahl al-Sunna for stating that the Hand of Allah does not pertain to a bodily appendage.4 This is similar to the pretext of the anthropomorphist who said: "We expelled Ibn Hibban from Sijistan for his lack of Religion: he used to say that Allah is not limited!"5
Ibn Baz's acolyte Muhammad Zinu mumbles a similar claim of corporeality in his book Tanbihat Hamma `ala Kitab Safwat al-Tafasir ("Important Cautions Regarding [al-Sabuni's three volume Qur'anic commentary] `The Quintessence of Commentaries'"). Al-Sabuni blasted both of them in his 1988 rebuttal, Kashf al-Iftira'at fi Risalat Tanbihat Hawla Safwat al-Tafasir ("Exposing the Lies of the Epistle `Cautions'").
Ibn Baz explicitly attributes a geographical direction to Allah Most High and Exalted, and affirms that such was the belief of "the Companions and those who followed them in excellence - they assert a direction for Allah, and that is the direction of height, believing that the Exalted is above the Throne."6
In his tract translated into English as Authentic Islamic Aqeedah and What Opposes It (p. 16), Ibn Baz calls those who visit the graves of saints "unbelievers" who commit what he calls kufr al-rubûbiyya. This fatwa compounds three innovations: (1) the dreadful sin of indiscriminately declaring millions of Muslims kâfir without the proofs and due process required by the purified Shari`a: (2) the blind, wholesale dismissal of the numerous orders of the Prophet
in the authentic Sunna to visit the graves for they are reminders of the hereafter; (3) the branding of Muslims with an innovated classification of disbelief he calls kufr al-rubûbiyya.The weakness of Ibn Baz's doctrinal positions can be inferred from the very title of one of his tracts purportedly designed to champion true doctrine: Iqamat al-Barahin `ala Hukmi man Istaghatha bi Ghayr Allah ("Establishing the Patent Proofs for the Judgment on Whoever Calls for Help Other than Allah"). For the licitness of istighâtha or calling for help of a creature QUALIFIED TO HELP, is patently established in the Qur'an and Sunna, as shown by the verse {And his countryman sought his help (istaghâthahu) against his enemy} (28:15) and al-Bukhari's narration of the Prophet
from Ibn `Umar - Allah be well-pleased with him - already quoted: "Truly the sun shall draw so near on the Day of Resurrection that sweat shall reach to the mid-ear, whereupon they shall ask (istaghâthû) help from Adam - upon him peace -, then from Musa - upon him peace -, then from Muhammad - Allah bless and greet him - who will intercede." Furthermore, Ibn Baz directly contradicts Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's words in Majmu`at al-Tawhid (p. 232): "We do not deny nor reject the invocation of help from the creature [as distinct >from the Creator] INSOFAR AS THE CREATED CAN HELP, as Allah Most High said in the story of Musa - upon him peace -: {And his countryman sought his help against his enemy}."An inveterate deprecator of the Prophet
and principal enemy of the Sufis, in one of his fatwas he asserts, "Among other things, the Messenger of Allah , after his death, never appears in a vision to a wakeful person. He of the ignorant Sufis who claims that he sees, while vigilant, the vision of the Prophet , or that that vision attends the Mawlids or the like, is guilty of the foulest error, and exceedingly deluded... the dead never rise out of their graves in this world save on the Day of Judgement."The above is a claim to know in their entirety: (a) the unseen, (b) the wherewithal of the Prophet
in Barzakh, and (c) the states of the servants of Allah Most High; in addition to an impious reference to the Prophet as "the dead"! Surely, it is ibn Baz who is dead while the Prophet - Allah bless and greet him -, as stated by Shaykh Muhammad ibn `Alawi in Manhaj al-Salaf, "is alive with a complete isthmus-life (hayât barzakhiyya) which is greater and better and more perfect than worldly life - indeed, higher, dearer, sweeter, more perfect, and more beneficial than worldly life."It is also related from one of the great Sufi shaykhs, Shaykh Abu al-Hasan al-Shadhili - may Allah have mercy upon him - who, unlike Ibn Baz, was only physically blind, whom the hadith master Ibn al-Mulaqqin mentioned in his Tabaqat al-Awliya, and concerning whom Ibn Daqiq al-`Id said: "I never saw anyone more knowledgeable of Allah," that he said: "If I ceased to see the Prophet
for one moment, I would no longer consider myself a Muslim." His teacher Abu al-`Abbas al-Mursi said the same. The Ghawth `Abd al-`Aziz al-Dabbagh said something similar, as reported from him by his student Ahmad ibn al-Mubarak in al-Ibriz. Assuredly, Shaykh Abd al-Aziz shall have to answer for his calumny of these Sufis among many others on the Day of Judgment, in addition to having issued legal judgments and spoken of the Prophet - Allah bless and greet him - without knowledge.As for attending Mawlid, "a vision" does not attend or do anything, but the spirits of the believers who passed away, together with the angels and the believing jinn, are certainly related to attend the gatherings of the pious all over the earth. Ibn al-Kharrat in al-`Aqiba, Ibn al-Qayyim in al-Ruh, al-Qurtubi in al-Tadhkira, Ibn Abi al-Dunya in al-Qubur, al-Suyuti in Sharh al-Sudur, Ibn Rajab in Ahwal al-Qubur, and others relate from many of the Salaf - including Imam Malik in al-Muwatta' - that the spirits of the believers in Barzakh are free to come and go anywhere they please. This is all the more possible for our Prophet - Allah bless and greet him - as we celebrate Mawlid specifically to remember him and invoke blessings upon him.
Ibn Baz passed a fatwa that "It is not permissible to celebrate the birthday of the Prophet
, in fact, it must be stopped, as it is an innovation in the religion." His sole proof for this declaring an act illicit and an innovation in Islam is that it did not take place in the early centuries of Islam, whereas al-Shafi`i and the Imams and scholars of the principles of jurisprudence defined innovation in the Religion as "that which was not practiced before AND contravenes the Qur'an and Sunna." It is noteworthy that the heads of the "Salafi" movement and those of their offshoots who propagate their views are always careful, through ignorance and/or duplicity, to omit this second, indispensable pre-condition in their definition of bid`a: Deobandis, Tablighis, Tahriris, Muhajiris, Jama`is, Ikhwanis, ICNA, ISNA, IANA, MAYA, JIMAS, WAMY, QSS, SAS, IIIE, and other Wahhabis. Furthermore, the majority of the scholars of Ahl al-Sunna - and Allah knows best - concur either outloud or tacitly on the licit character of the celebration of the Mawlid provided the usual etiquette of Islam in public gatherings is kept. Lastly, the Hanbali school in its entirety never declared forbidden the celebration of the Mawlid and even Ibn Taymiyya stated that one who celebrates it with sincere intentions will be rewarded!7Ibn Baz revived the innovation and invalid fatwa of Ibn Taymiyya to the effect that it is forbidden to travel with the intention of visiting the Prophet
in his notes on Ibn Hajar's Fath al-Bari, book of Fadl al-Salat fi Makka wal-Madina, where Ibn Hajar comments on Ibn Taymiyya's prohibition of travel for Ziyara: "Ibn Taymiyya said: `This kind of trip - traveling to visit the grave of the Prophet - Allah bless and greet him - is a disobedience, and salât must not be shortened during it.' This is one of the ugliest matters reported from Ibn Taymiyya." To which Ibn Baz reacts in a footnote: "It is not ugly, and Ibn Taymiyya was right." Indeed, Ibn Hajar's teacher, Zayn al-Din al-`Iraqi, rightly called it in his Tarh al-Tathrib (6:43) "a strange and ugly saying."Bin Baz also reduplicates word for word and without the least critical analysis or original understanding of the evidence the pretense of Ibn Taymiyya whereby "The hadiths that concern the desirability of visiting the grave of the Prophet
are all weak, indeed forged." By the grace of Allah Most High this pseudo-bold and fashionable claim - among "Salafis" - has been laid to its final resting-ground by Shaykh Mahmud Mamduh's superb documentation work titled Raf` al-Minara fi Takhrij Ahadith al-Tawassul wa al-Ziyara ("Raising the Lighthouse: Documentation of the Narrations Pertaining to Using an Intermediary and Visitation").Another astonishing deviation of Ibn Baz in his remarks on Fath al-Bari is his characterizing the visit of the Companion Bilal ibn al-Harth - Allah be well-pleased with him - to the grave of the Prophet - Allah bless and greet him - and his tawassul for rain there as "aberrant" (munkar) and "an avenue to polytheism" (wasîla ilâ al-shirk)."8
One of his innovations in usûl is his public declaration - in the Saudi periodical al-Majalla - that he does not adhere to the Hanbali Madhhab "but only to the Qur'an and Sunna," whereas Ibn Taymiyya said himself asserted in Mukhtasar al-Fatawa al-Misriyya that the truth is not found, in the whole Shari`a, outside the four Schools. Nor have any two Sunni Ulema on the face of the earth agreed on the qualification of Ibn Baz as an absolute Mujtahid capable of extracting his own proofs and School from the primary evidences of the Law. On the contrary, his fiqh is superficial compared to his subordinate Ibn `Uthaymin, his natural bent for taqlîd is evident, his blunders numerous, and his innovations countless.
Among the other innovations of Ibn Baz in doctrine, he tried to rectify whatever did not please him in Fath al-Bari by the Imam and hadith master Ibn Hajar al-`Asqalani with interpersed remarks that do not qualify as commentary but as an attempt to substitute Ibn Hajar's Ash`ari Sunni doctrine with anthropomorphism as the Islamic creed.9
Under his leadership, Ibn Taymiyya's Majmu`a al-Fatawa al-Kubra received a new edition from which the 10th volume - on tasawwuf - was suppressed. Similar examples of unreliable editorship and blatant tampering of the scholarly heritage abound at the hands of Wahhabis:
1- In the book of al-Adhkar by Imam Muhyi al-Din al-Nawawi as published by Dar al-Huda in al-Riyad in 1409/1989 and edited by `Abd al-Qadir al-Arna'ut of Damascus, page 295, the chapter-title, "Section on Visiting the Grave of the Messenger
" was substituted with the title, "Section on Visiting the Mosque of the Messenger of Allah " together with the suppression of several lines from the beginning of the section and its end, and the suppression of al-`Utbi's famous story of intercession which Imam al-Nawawi had mentioned in full.10 When al-Arna'ut was asked about it, he replied that the Ryad agents were the ones who had changed and tampered with the text. A facsimile of his own hand-written statement to that effect was printed in full in Shaykh Mahmud Mamduh's Raf` al-Minara (p. 72-75).2- Suppression of al-Sawi's (d. 1241/1825) words on modern-time Kharijis in his supercommentary on Tafsir al-Jalalayn titled Hashiya `ala Tafsir al-Jalalayn (v. 58:18-19), "namely, a sect in the Hijaz named Wahhabis" from all new editions beginning from the Eighties.11
3- Zuhayr al-Shawish's suppression of the word "substitute-saints" (al-abdâl) from his al-Maktab al-Islami (3rd) edition of Ibn Taymiyya's `Aqida Wasitiyya in the following passage: "The true adherents of Islam in its pristine purity are Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama`a. In their ranks are found the truthful saints (al-siddîqûn), the martyrs, and the righteous. Among them are the great men of guidance and illumination, of recorded integrity and celebrated virtue. And among them are the substitute-saints (al-abdâl) - the Imams - concerning whose guidance and knowledge the Muslims are in full accord. These are the Victorious Group..." as found in the Cairo Salafiyya edition (p. 36) and the Majmu`a al-Rasa'il al-Kubra (3:159).
4- Suppression of the chapter that concerns the Friends of Allah (al-awliyâ'), Substitute-Saints (al-abdâl), and the Righteous (al-sâlihîn) >from Ibn `Abidin's Epistles.12
5- Removal of Abu Hayyan's denunciation of Ibn Taymiyya as an anthropomorphist from his two Tafsirs, al-Bahr al-Muhit and al-Nahr al-Madd min al-Bahr (passage on Ayat al-Kursi).
6- Interpolation of the phrase bidhâtihi ("in person") into al-Gilani's mention of Allah Most High establishing Himself over the Throne as well as the takfîr of Imam Abu Hanifa in his classic al-Ghunya.
7- Interpolations among the same lines as well as the takfîr of Imam Abu Hanifa in al-Ash`ari's al-Ibana.
8- Suppressions and additions along anthropomorphist lines in al-Nawawi's Sharh Sahih Muslim from as early as Ibn al-Subki's time.
9- Anthropomorphist additions to al-Alusi's Ruh al-Ma`ani transmitted by his "Salafi" son Nu`man as shown by a comparison with its autograph manuscript.
10- Commissioning Muhammad Muhsin Khan and Muhammad Taqi al-Din al-Hilali with English translations of the motherbooks of Islam such as the Qur'an, al-Bukhari's Sahih, al-Zabidi's al-Tajrid al-Sarih, al-Naysaburi's al-Lu'lu' wa al-Marjan etc. when Khan was only trained as a chest doctor while the late Moroccan-born Hilali had no more than a poor mastery of the English language.13 Hence their translations are clumsy, inelegant, filled with gaps and approximations, and further corrupted by deliberate manipulations of meaning along doctrinal lines as shown by the following example in their Sahih al-Bukhari, Volume 8, Book 76, Number 549: "Narrated Ibn `Abbas: `The Prophet
said, "The people were displayed in front of me and I saw one prophet passing by with a large group of his followers, and another prophet passing by with only a small group of people, and another prophet passing by with only ten (persons), and another prophet passing by with only five (persons), and another prophet passed by alone. And then I looked and saw a large multitude of people, so I asked Gibril, "Are these people my followers?' He said, `No, but look towards the horizon.' I looked and saw a very large multitude of people. Gibril said. `Those are your followers, and those are seventy thousand (persons) in front of them who will neither have any reckoning of their accounts nor will receive any punishment.' I asked, `Why?' He said, `For they used not to treat themselves with branding (cauterization) NOR WITH RUQYA (GET ONESELF TREATED BY THE RECITATION OF SOME VERSES OF THE QUR'AN) and not to see evil omen in things, and they used to put their trust (only) in their Lord." On hearing that, `Ukasha bin Mihsan got up and said (to the Prophet), "Invoke Allah to make me one of them." The Prophet said, "O Allah, make him one of them." Then another man got up and said (to the Prophet), "Invoke Allah to make me one of them." The Prophet said, `Ukasha has preceded you."'"As demonstrated in the text of the Encyclopedia of Islamic Doctrine (6:137-149) on ta'wîz, there is a Jahili ruqyâ, and there is a Sunni ruqyâ. The former is made with other than what is allowed in the Religion, such as amulets, talismans, spells, incantations, charms, magic and the like: and that is what the Prophet
meant in the above hadith. But the translator Khan mischaracterized it, in his parenthetical gloss, as the Sunna ruqyâ consisting in using some verses of the Qur'an or permitted du'â for treatment! Thus he suggests, in his manipulation, exactly the reverse of what the Prophet - Allah bless and greet him - said and practiced, and the reverse of what the Companions said and practiced both in the time of the Prophet - Allah bless and greet him - and after his time. One well-known probative example of the Sunna ruqyâ is the use of the Fatiha by one of the Companions to heal a scorpion-bite - and the Prophet approved of it - as narrated by al-Bukhari elsewhere in his Sahih.1411- The 1999 translation of al-Nawawi's Riyad al-Salihin published by Darussalam publications out of Riyad makes a similar interpolation distorting the meaning of the words of the Prophet - Allah bless and greet him -: "They are those who do not make RUQYAH (BLOWING OVER THEMSELVES AFTER RECITING THE QUR'AN OR SOME PRAYERS AND SUPPLICATIONS THE PROPHET - Allah bless and greet him - used to say)."15 Observe their equating something the Prophet
used to do with an act that those who enter Paradise do not do. The same book calls al-Albani "the leading authority in the science of hadith" (p. 88), declares that "in case of breach of ablution, the wiping over the socks is sufficient, and there is no need for washing the feet" (p. 31), that "ours should not be the belief that the dead do hear and reply [our greeting]" (p. 515), and that expressing the intention (niyya) verbally before salât "is a Bid`ah (innovation in religion) because no proof of it is found in Sharî`ah" (p. 14)!12- Other manipulations of meaning along anthropomorphist lines and dilly-dallying can be seen in Khan-Hilali's discrepant, multiple translations of the meanings of the Qur'an into English. An example of this confusion is in the footnote to the verse of the Throne (2:255) for the word kursiyyuhu, translated as "His Throne": "Throne: seat."16 In a later edition by the same M.M. Khan and his friend M. Taqi al-Din al-Hilali, the word is left untranslated, giving "His Kursî," with a footnote stating:
"Kursî: literally a footstool or chair, and sometimes wrongly translated as Throne[!]. Ibn Taimiyah said: a) To believe in the Kursî. b) To believe in the `Arsh (Throne) [sic]. It is narrated from Muhammad bin `Abdullâh and from other religious scholars that the Kursî is in front of the `Arsh (Throne) and it is at the level of the Feet. (Fatawa Ibn Taimiyah, Vol. 5, Pages 54, 55)."17
None of the above explanations is authentically related from the Prophet - Allah bless and greet him -, least of all the astonishing mention of "the Feet"18 - and who are "Muhammad bin `Abdullâh" and the "other religious scholars"?! Nor is the call for imitating what "Ibn Taymiyya said to believe" other than a bankrupt innovation. Nor is the translation of kursî as "Throne" wrong when called for in certain cases, as in the narration: "On the Day of Resurrection your Prophet shall be brought and shall be made to sit in front of Allah the Almighty, on His kursî."19 Some of the Salaf, among them al-Hasan al-Basri, even explicitly said that the kursî is the `arsh.20 Furthermore, it is authentically related from Ibn `Abbas that he said: "His kursî is His knowledge (kursiyyuhu `ilmuhu),"21 and this is the explanation preferred by the Imams of the Salaf such as Sufyan al-Thawri, al-Bukhari, al-Tabari, al-Bayhaqi, and others.
13- Other examples of Khan-Hilali's bamboozled translations: "Then he rose over (Istawâ) towards the heaven" (p. 643) as compared to Pickthall's {Then turned He to the heaven when it was smoke} (41:11) and Yusuf `Ali's over-figurative "Moreover He comprehended in His design the sky, and it had been (as) smoke"; "and then He rose over (Istawâ) the Throne (really in a manner that suits His Majesty)" (p. 208) as compared to Pickthall's simple {then mounted He the Throne} (7:54) and `Ali's typical "then He established Himself on the Throne (of authority)"; "Do you feel secure that He, Who is over the heaven (Allâh)" (p. 772) as compared to Pickthall's literal (Have ye taken security from Him Who is in the heaven (fî al-samâ')( (67:16-17) and `Ali's "Do ye feel secure that He Who is in Heaven"; etc.
14- The translation of verse 2:200 states: "So when you have accomplished your Manaasik, remember Allâh as you remember your forefathers or with a far more rememberance" (p. 43)!; etc. Did Ibn Baz, "The Presidency of Islamic Researches, Ifta, Call and Guidance," and the "King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Qur'an" all think so cheaply of the Book of Allah and so dearly of their own agenda that the basic grammar and syntax of the translation of its meanings into the most heavily spoken language on earth did not deserve to be double-checked by a competent English proofreader before being printed on the best bible paper, sewn-bound, and distributed freely at huge cost?
Ibn Baz did his best to aid and abet the main innovators of our time such as al-Albani, on whom he bestowed the King Faysal Prize "for services rendered to Islam" (!) the year before their respective deaths; al-Albani's student and deputy in Kuwait, `Abd al-Rahman `Abd al-Khaliq the author of the despicable attack on the Friends of Allah which he titled Fada'ih al-Sufiyya ("The Disgraces of the Sufis") and which al-Buti termed an exercise in calumny; Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi`i who asked that the Noble Grave be brought out of the Mosque and the Green Dome destroyed, and roamed the land in Yemen with armed thugs, digging up the graves of the dead with picks and spades; Abu Bakr al-Jaza'iri, Muhammad Zino, `Abd al-Rahman Dimashqiyya, and their ilk...
As Sayyid Yusuf al-Rifa`i said to the Ulema of Najd: "You left none but yourselves as those who are saved, forgetting the Prophet's - Allah bless and greet him - saying: `If anyone says, `The people have perished,' then he has perished the most."22
NOTES
1 Muhammad ibn Mani` as quoted by al-Albani in the latter's commentary in al-`Aqida al-Tahawiyya, Sharh wa Ta`liq, 2nd ed. (ed. Zuhayr Shawish, Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1993) p. 46.
2 Tanbihat Hamma (Kuwait: Jam`iyya Ihya' al-Turath al-Islami, p. 22).
3 Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bari (1959 ed. 3:361 #1425).
4 Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bari (1959 ed. 3:361 n.; 1989 ed. 3:357 n.)
5 See Ibn al-Subki, Tabaqat al-Shafi`iyya al-Kubra (3:132) and his stand-alone, edited Qa`ida fi al-Jarh wa al-Ta`dil (p. 31-33) [TSK (2:13)].
6 Notes on Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bari (1989 ed. 3:37-38; 1959 ed. 3:32-33 #1094).
7 A thorough refutation of Ibn Baz's fatwa on Mawlid was issued by the Imam Ahmed Raza Academy in South Africa and published on the Internet.
8 Al-Bayhaqi and others narrate from Malik al-Dar, `Umar's treasurer, that the people suffered a drought during the successorship of `Umar, whereupon a man came to the grave of the Prophet
and said: "O Messenger of God, ask for rain for your Community, for verily they have but perished," after which the Prophet - Allah bless and greet him - appeared to him in a dream and told him: "Go to `Umar and give him my greeting, then tell him that they will be watered. Tell him: You must be clever, you must be clever!" The man went and told `Umar. The latter said: "O my Lord, I spare no effort except in what escapes my power!" Ibn Kathir cites it thus from al-Bayhaqi in al-Bidaya wa al-Nihaya (7:92) and says: isnâduhu sahîh; Ibn Abi Shayba cites it in his Musannaf with a sound chain as confirmed by Ibn Hajar who cites the hadith in the 3rd chapter of the book of Istisqa' in Fath al-Bari (1989 ed. 2:629-630) and al-Isaba (3:484), identifying the man who visited and saw the Prophet - Allah bless and greet him - in his dream as the Companion Bilal ibn al-Harth. He counts this hadith as one of the reasons for al-Bukhari's naming of the chapter "The people's request to their leader for rain if they suffer drought."9 Cf. section, "Dwarves on the Shoulders of Giants" in Shaykh Hisham Kabbani's Encyclopedia of Islamic Doctrine (1:174-177) = Islamic Beliefs and Doctrine (p. 204-208).
10 See: http://sunnah.org/msaec/articles/arnaut.htm.
11 See Reforming Classical Texts - How widespread is tampering of texts by the Salafis.
12 Namely, the epitle titled Ijabat al-Ghawth bi Bayan Hal al-Abdal wa al-Ghawth that can be found in the original edition of Ibn `Abidin's Rasa'il (2:264-284).
13 As revealed to the author by Dr. Muhammad Mustafa al-A`zami who personally knew Hilali. Perhaps Hilali's close friend Dr. Abu al-Hasan al-Nadwi should be credited for these translations instead of him.
14 The correct translation of the above hadith is: The Prophet - Allah bless and greet him - said: The people were displayed in front of me and I saw one Prophet passing by with a large group of his followers, another Prophet passing by with only a small group of people, another Prophet passing by with only ten (persons), another Prophet passing by with only five (persons), and another Prophet passed by alone. And then I looked and saw a large multitude of people (sawâd `azîm), so I asked Gibril: "Are these people my followers?" He said: "No, but look towards the horizon." I looked and saw a very large multitude of people. Gibril said: "Those are your followers, and there are seventy thousand of them in front of them who will neither have any reckoning of their accounts nor will receive any punishment." I asked: "Why?" He said: "They used not to treat themselves with cauterization nor amulets, nor to see auguries and omens in birds, and they relied solely upon their Lord." On hearing this, `Ukkasha ibn Mihsan stood up and said to the Prophet
: "Invoke Allah to make me one of them." The Prophet - Allah bless and greet him - said: "O Allah, make him one of them." Then another man stood up and said to the Prophet: "Invoke Allah to make me one of them." The Prophet - Allah bless and greet him - said: `Ukkasha has preceded you with this request."15 Riyâd-us-Sâliheen, vol. 1, translated by Muhammad Amin ibn Razduq with a commentary by Hafiz Yusuf (p. 94).
16 Footnote #298 in The Holy Qur-an: English Translation of the Meanings and Commentary, Revised and Edited by The Presidency of Islamic Researches, Ifta, Call and Guidance (Madinah: King Fahd Holy Qur-an Printing Complex, 1410 [1990]).
17 The Noble Qur'an: English Translation of the Meanings and Commentary by Muhammad Taqi al-Din al-Hilali and Muhammad Muhsin Khan, Revised and Edited by The Presidency of Islamic Researches, Ifta, Call and Guidance (Madinah: King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Qur'an, 1417 [1997] (p. 57 n. 1).
18 See al-Bayhaqi, al-Asma' wa al-Sifat (Hashidi ed. 2:196 #758), Ibn al-Jawzi, al-`Ilal (1:22), al-Dhahabi al-Mizan (2:265), Ibn Kathir, Tafsir (1:317), Ibn Hajar, al-Tahdhib (4:274), and al-Ahdab, Zawa'id Tarikh Baghdad (7:37-39 #1383).
19 Narrated mawqûf from `Abd Allah ibn Salam by Ibn Abi `Asim in al-Sunna (p. 351 #786) and al-Tabari in his Tafsir (8:100).
20 Narrated by al-Tabari, Tafsir (3:10).
21 Narrated marfû` from the Prophet
by Sufyan al-Thawri with a sound chain according to Ibn Hajar in Fath al-Bari (1959 ed. 8:199) and al-Tabarani in al-Sunna; and mawqûf from Ibn `Abbas by al-Tabari with three sound chains in his Tafsir (3:9-11), al-Mawardi in his Tafsir (1:908), al-Suyuti in al-Durr al-Manthur (1:327), al-Shawkani in Fath al-Qadir (1:245), and others. Al-Tabari chooses it as the most correct explanation: "The external wording of the Qur'an indicates the correctness of the report from Ibn `Abbas that it [the kursî] is His `ilm... and the original sense of al-kursî is al-`ilm." Also narrated in "suspended" form (mu`allaq) by al-Bukhari in his Sahih from Sa`id ibn Jubayr (Book of Tafsir, chapter on the saying of Allah Most High: {And if you go in fear, then (pray) standing or on horseback} (2:239). Its chains are documented by Ibn Hajar in Taghliq al-Ta`liq (2/4:185-186) where he shows that Sufyan al-Thawri, `Abd al-Rahman ibn Mahdi, and Waki` narrated it marfû` from the Prophet , although in the Fath he declares the mawqûf version from Ibn `Abbas more likely.22 Narrated from Abu Hurayra by Malik, Ahmad, Muslim, al-Bukhari in al-Adab al-Mufrad, and Abu Dawud.
Wal-`Aqibatu lil-Muttaqin.
GF Haddad ©
SEPTEMBER 1999 • VOLUME VI: NUMBER 3
Related Articles
The Power of Saudi Arabia's Islamic Leaders
by Nawaf E. Obaid
Middle East Quarterly
September 1999, pp. 51-58
Middle East Quarterly
September 1999, pp. 51-58
http://www.meforum.org/482/the-power-of-saudi-arabias-islamic-leaders
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ShareNawaf E. Obaid is a graduate of Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and a former visiting fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Even those Americans who watch Saudi Arabia the most closely admit to being baffled by the country. Ronald Neumann, deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs admits that "we don't understand how the Saudis make decisions."1 Likewise, John Gannon, former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), acknowledges that his agency lacks intelligence on Saudi Arabia.2 As a result of these limitations, the U.S. government has been only moderately successful in assessing trends or predicting events in the kingdom.
How can the U.S. government—and other interested parties—improve their understanding of Saudi Arabia? One way is by developing a deeper appreciation of the role the religious establishment plays in the political decision-making process. To make this point, it is instructive to examine the role of the ulema (Islamic men of religion) in four key decisions: to institute the oil embargo following the Yom Kippur War of 1973, to allow U.S. troops onto Saudi soil in 1990 and then permit them to remain, and to support the Taliban since 1994.
In reaction to what he considered Islam's degeneration, Sheikh ‘Abd al-Wahhab founded what is generally known as Wahhabism, a movement based on a particularly strict interpretation of Islamic law. Among their many regulations, Wahhabis sought separation from non-Muslims; indeed, the strictest of them eschew all contact with Christians, Jews, or other infidels.4 The Saudi ulema today, as in the past, see themselves as guardians of this legacy.
While the ulema hold a variety of positions in Saudi institutions—they are judges (qadis), lawyers (muhama), and prayer leaders (imams)—only a few of them wield real power.5 Appointed by the king, these latter individuals staff several leading organizations.6
Lacking as they do formal control over policymaking, the power of the ulema is missed by many observers in the West, who mistakenly assume that their influence is limited to the religious sphere. In fact, the ulema exercise their sway in subtle, silent ways. While their input varies depending on the domestic circumstances and the strength of the Saud family, the king can never completely ignore them but must take their views into consideration in every choice he makes. The following four political decisions, which baffled many Western analysts at the time, become a bit clearer when the ulema are factored into Saudi decision-making.
The causes of the embargo can be traced to the Six-Day War of June 1967, when Israel won a devastating victory over the armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, occupying substantial territories. As late as October 1972, King Faysal dismissed the prospect of a boycott, saying that it was useless to talk about oil as an instrument of pressure against the U.S., indeed, that it was dangerous even to think along those lines.10 But by April 1973, the king began sending signals to the U.S. government that unless some progress was made with regard to Israel withdrawing from the lands it took in 1967, the Arabs would use their oil for political leverage.11 What he meant by this was not clear. At first, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Zaki Yamani merely argued that Saudi Arabia would not increase production.12 Then, on July 6, 1973, King Faysal announced that Saudi Arabia would like to continue friendly ties with the United States, but that this would be difficult unless the latter adopted a more even-handed policy in the region.13
As President Anwar as-Sadat of Egypt prepared to assault the Israeli lines along the Suez Canal in a bid to regain lost land, he visited King Faysal in August 1973 to discuss his plans and to win his support. The Saudi monarch quietly agreed to contribute $500 million to Egypt's war chest and to weigh in with the oil weapon.14 In September, Deputy Oil Minister Prince Saud al-Faysal stated that "Saudi Arabia is undoubtedly now prepared to use its key position as a major world supplier of crude oil to bring pressure on the U.S. government to moderate its pro-Israeli policy."15 The following chronology helps to understand the evolution of Saudi thinking after hostilities began on October 6:
Much has been written about the change in policy between October 17 and October 20.21 At first glance, it would seem that the $2.2 billion appropriations bill was the deciding factor. Or was the embargo a fulfillment of King Faysal's promise to Sadat? In fact, neither of these factors fully explains the king's decision: he knew the United States was merely supplying the Israelis to counter similar efforts by the Soviets to supply the Egyptians; and if he was motivated primarily by a promise to Sadat, why did he wait until two weeks after the war had begun to implement the embargo?
Understanding Saudi decisions is never a simple matter. William Quandt of the University of Virginia lists nine separate factors to take into account when interpreting Saudi oil policy: market conditions, revenue requirements, technical problems, internal politics, expectations (of price, inflation rate, security of foreign investment, etc.), Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) pressures, associated gas needs, relations with the United States, and the Palestinian problem.22 While all of these factors are important, Quandt errs in not mentioning Saudi Arabia's religious responsibilities and the role of the ulema. This absence is indicative of American policy analysts' general misunderstanding and underestimation of the role these elements play in Saudi decision-making.
Pressure from the ulema (and the rapidly changing military situation in the war's
final days) helps to explain the Saudi government's decision to implement an oil embargo. This move accomplished two of the ulema's objectives: increasing the kingdom's stature as a leader in the Muslim world while distancing the country from the West. As a former senior official in the Saudi land forces told me, there was a tacit agreement between the king and the senior ulema along the following lines: if the war goes badly in Egypt, King Faysal would implement an oil embargo.
Specifically, Grand Mufti and Chief Qadi Sheikh Muhammad Al ash-Sheikh (born
ca. 1895), one of King Faysal's closest advisors, had great influence on the king's concept of his political role in the Arab world and Saudi Arabia's importance as guardian of Islam's holiest shrines and cities. Many observers attribute his influence to King Faysal's famous proclamation: "My dream is to pray in the morning in Mecca,
in the afternoon in Medina, and in the evening in Jerusalem—without ever leaving Arab land."23 This statement shows that King Faysal shared the ulema's devotion to the Palestinian cause and their strong objection to Israeli control of Jerusalem.
Yet the Saudi monarch realized that an embargo might hurt Saudi interests, knowing of the country's need for U.S. support. Also, he may have been worried about the long-term implications of the rise in oil prices that would accompany an embargo. These tensions exist during any period in which Arab-Islamic interests seriously conflict with U.S. interests: Saudis are at once fearful of Western secular contamination and acutely aware of its need for U.S. support. King Faysal had ample reason to be cautious in the use of the oil weapon and to delay its use as long as possible. He could afford to ignore the pressure from the ulema as long as the Egyptians seemed not to be losing the war. By October 19, however, news that the Egyptians faced a near total defeat reached the Saudi king, tilting the balance in favor of the ulema. The next day, he announced the embargo.
Thus, the Saudis implemented the embargo not primarily to fulfill a promise or a threat, nor to increase the price of oil, nor even as a weapon to help destroy Israel, but to satisfy the growing frustration of the ulema and preempt internal demands that the United States be punished for its role in the Israeli victory.24
The Ford administration could have better predicted the embargo had it kept in mind the unique balance Saudi leaders must make between secular and religious forces and the limitations that are imposed on them by their country's role as a leader of the Arab world. As is, the Americans did not fully understand the forces at work in the Saudi decision-making process; specifically, they lacked an appreciation of the Saudi monarch's religious responsibilities. Had they understood this more fully, they could have dealt more effectively with Riyadh, perhaps even avoiding the embargo. For instance, the U.S. government could more forcefully have announced its intention to secure a fair peace or even to work toward implementation of the spirit of U.N. Resolution 242 (returning Israel to its 1967 borders). Either of these moves would have given King Faysal more room to maneuver, while neither would have gone against U.S. policy (which was to support a limited but not total victory for the Israelis). In fact, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was en route to Moscow to discuss cease-fire terms when the embargo news hit, and even his travel itinerary might have been sufficient to prevent the Saudis from implementing the embargo.25
When the U.S. government first offered troops in August 1990 to protect the kingdom and free Kuwait, its plans met with enormous domestic opposition. According to a highly-placed official, King Fahd called the ulema and senior members of the Sheikh family before making a decision. He raised with them the question of allowing foreign non-Muslim troops onto Saudi soil. At first, the idea met staunch opposition, with all the senior ulema categorically against the idea and refusing to consent to such a decision.
Only after long discussions with the king and other senior members of the royal family did the grand mufti, Sheikh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Baz, reluctantly endorse the idea, and even so only on condition that the government provide solid proof of a threat. It did, and the ulema relented in part because satellite images delivered by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and General Norman Schwartzkopf clearly showed thousands of Iraqi troops massed at the border. At the same time, reports from the Saudi armed forces inspired little confidence in the kingdom's ability to defend itself. King Fahd called together 350 Islamic leaders and scholars to Mecca to debate this topic. This effort resulted in the following edict (fatwa), issued by Sheikh bin Baz:
The war against Iraq was won, to be sure, but it brought charges of dishonor that in a tribal society are not easily expunged. It also incurred the serious Islamic accusation of fitna—dissension, setting Muslim against Muslim. Years later, the king was still pondering his decision to invite in non-Muslim troops. "The Lord of glory and grandeur helped us with soldiers from all parts of the world," he told the Consultative Council. "Many said that the presence of foreign forces was wrong. But I say ... it was [a case of] extreme necessity."29
The negative impact was not only long term and theoretical; the depth of these feelings were shown in the bombings that took place in Riyadh on November 13, 1995, at the Saudi National Guard communications complex, killing five American military trainers and two Indians; and in Dhahran on June 25, 1996, at the Khobar Towers, a U.S. military housing compound, killing nineteen American servicemen.
Had the Clinton administration paid more attention to the warning signs and had a better assessment of the extreme elements in the Saudi religious establishment, they might have better prepared for these assaults. Following the Kuwait war, most of the senior ulema resisted the presence of U.S. troops on Saudi soil, leading to an upsurge in anti-Western rhetoric. Many preachers built a following by specifically decrying the presence of foreign infidels and denouncing Saudi leaders for their dependence on the United States.30 The two most vocal of these were Sheikh Salman al-‘Awda and Sheikh Safar al-Hawali. The former compared members of the royal family to the last sultans of the Ottoman Empire and the Americans to an occupying force. His and other extremist groups gained enormous popular support through statements directly targeting U.S., French, and British troops. Significantly, he drew his support largely from Burayda, a town known as a bastion of Islamic extremism.
The government arrested the most disruptive of these individuals after the Kuwait war. When it detained Sheikh al-‘Awda in 1994, his followers took the dangerous step of intervening in an attempt to prevent him from losing his freedom; the sheikh's arrest only took place when he decided to go to the precinct with his followers, all of whom also turned themselves in to the police.31 All were placed under house arrest. His followers were released after several weeks but the sheikh remained under house arrest until June 1999.
Lapses in U.S. security at the base prior to the attack made things worse. After the Khobar explosion, the American task force studying the situation, headed by General Wayne Downing (former commander of the Special Operations Command), found many problems.32 The report cited no less than ten suspicious incidents in the ninety days before the attack. Despite the fact that Khobar Towers had been identified to Brigadier General Terry Schwalier, commander of the U.S. Air Force Squadron at the Dhahran airbase, as one of the three most likely targets in the area, he did not make counterterrorism a top priority there. Although Schwalier was the only American blamed for the bombings, the failure should be understood as a result of the general gaps in U.S. understanding of the Saudi situation, both military33 and political.34
In the 1980s, the United States and Saudi Arabia both funded Afghanistan's mujahidin (warriors of jihad, or sacred war), rebels fighting Soviet troops backing the puppet regime in Kabul. Soon after the Soviets pulled out in 1989, an alliance of seven Islamic mujahidin parties defeated Najibullah, the leftist leader of the Soviet-backed regime. This alliance, however, quickly disintegrated, its members fighting among themselves.35 By mid-1994, the Taliban had emerged as a powerful new force and soon began to gain victories across the country. By mid-1999, they controlled some 90 percent of Afghanistan and may be on the verge of complete victory.
The Taliban have brought an end to the fighting in much of the countryside, but at a tremendous cost in human freedom. Their government has been criticized around the world for the human rights violations that spring from its purist interpretation of Islamic law. Women must wear a burqa, which covers nearly the entire body; they are not allowed to work or attend school and cannot leave their homes without a male guardian. Men must not shave. Music and television are forbidden. Punishments considered severe by Western standards are common and include the cutting off of the hands of thieves and the stoning to death of women found guilty of committing adultery.
The stunning success of the Taliban could not have happened without direct support from Pakistan and financial backing from Saudi Arabia.36 In addition, the U.S. government played an important role. A former high-ranking Pakistani civil servant with close ties to his country's intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), told me that "the U.S. provided the weapons and the know-how; the Saudis provided the funds; and we provided the training camps and operations bases for the mujahidin in the early 1980s, then for the Taliban." A senior Saudi military officer confirmed this: "The first government formed after the departure of the Soviets proved to be intractable; therefore, the Saudis and the United States chose the Taliban, with the firm belief that the Taliban would be able to take over the country." Henry Kissinger writes that although the U.S. and the Taliban had nothing in common, they shared a common enemy and that made them allies.37
The fundamentalist Taliban state now poses a threat to U.S. interests. First, it may well attempt to export its brand of fundamentalism to the neighboring states of Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. "Since we have lit the torch of truth in Afghanistan," said Haji Mawin, the Taliban's Supreme Council Vice-Chairman, "naturally it will light the torch in other countries."38
Second, the Taliban host Usama bin Ladin, the Saudi patron of fundamentalist Islamic movements. Though Saudi and U.S. intelligence fingered him as a suspect in the bombings of American targets in Saudi Arabia, Kenya, and Tanzania, the Taliban have shown little intention of expelling him (though they reportedly did urge him to end his support for terrorism).39
The U.S. government's policy analysis in Afghanistan was flawed; had it more clearly understood the nature of the Saudi religious establishment, it might have seen the warning signals sent off by Saudi support for the Taliban. An analysis of Saudi aid could have predicted the emergence of a threatening regime in Afghanistan. The origin of this support goes back to the early eighties, when the Saudi government provided backing to the mujahidin. By mid-1994, when the mujahidin had splintered, that support focused on the one element that had emerged from the disintegration: the Taliban.
While the kingdom's technical and financial support are well known, the religious elements are not. That the Taliban favors a brand of Sunni Islam close to the Wahhabi variant tends to confirm this connection.40 A high-ranking official in the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Guidance told me that once the Soviets were defeated, the Saudi ulema focused on funding and promoting the Taliban. The Taliban are largely composed of the children of Afghan refugees educated at Pakistani theological schools41 run by Pakistanis who received their degrees from Saudi Arabia and taught a strict form of Wahhabi theology and law. Far from being merely a recipient of Saudi aid and moral support, the Taliban are a creature of the kingdom.
This overly sanguine assessment of Wahhabism may result from the creed's relatively innocuous manifestation in contemporary Saudi Arabia. Aside from intermittent denunciations of America and nebulous links to terrorism, Wahhabis do not seem to represent a serious threat, especially when contrasted with the Iranian or Sudanese fundamentalists. This is largely due to their historic power-sharing relationship with the secular authorities, which dictates that the clergy in most cases defer to the government. However, government decisions can often be best understood with reference to the power of the ulema and from the conservative masses from which that power derives.
This misunderstanding has until now had only limited negative consequences for the United States, but miscalculations could prove far more dangerous in the coming years, as the kingdom enters a period of rapid and deep change. The government is likely to be challenged on public policy issues as the population quickly expands and oil revenues decrease. These developments will likely permit the religious establishment a louder voice in the consensual power sharing relationship in the kingdom. The Taliban government offers a chance to witness a Wahhabi-style government without the moderating presence of the Saud royal family; as such, it offers a possible glimpse of Saudi Arabia if the traditional balance of power is disrupted in favor of the religious establishment.
1 Interview with the author, Nov. 1997.
2 Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 17, 1997.
3 "Al" here is Arabic for "family," not "the."
4 Liesl Graz, The Turbulent Gulf (New York: St. Martins, 1992), p. 127.
5 Mordechai Abir, Saudi Arabia: Government, Society, and the Gulf Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 25.
6 Such as the Council of the Assembly of Senior Ulema (Majlis Hay'at Kibar al-‘Ulama'), the Higher Council of Qadis (Al-Majlis al-‘Ali li'l-Qada'), the morality police (known as the Mutwawa'in).
7 U.S. News and World Report, Oct. 24, 1983.
8 David Long, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997), p. 69.
9 Oct. 18, 1973.
10 David Golub, When Oil and Politics Mix: Saudi Oil Policy, 1973-1985 (Cambridge: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 1985), p. 8.
11 Long, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 69.
12 Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1985, p. 154.
13 Ibid., p. 155.
14 Ibid., p 156.
15 Golub, When Oil and Politics Mix, p. 71.
16 Ibid., p. 10.
17 Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security, p. 157.
18 Golub, When Oil and Politics Mix, p. 11.
19 The New York Times, Oct. 18, 1973.
20 Ibid., Oct. 21, 1973.
21 Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security, p. 155.
22 William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security and Oil (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982), pp. 126-128.
23 Benoist Mechin, Faiçal: Roi d'Arabie (Paris: Albin Michel, 1986), pp. 40-42.
24 Golub, When Oil and Politics Mix, p. 12.
25 Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security, p. 160.
26 Abir, Saudi Arabia: Government, Society, and the Gulf Crisis, p. 178.
27 Ibid.
28 Anthony Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997), p. 37.
29 The Economist, Mar. 18, 1995.
30 Chicago Tribune, Sept. 24, 1996.
31 "Revolt in Buraydah," videotape released by the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) in London, 1996.
32 The Downing Commission's main allegations concerned the insufficiency of the base security system: "leaders failed to provide clear standards, adequate funding and attention to protect American forces." Chicago Tribune, Sept. 17, 1996.
33 U.S. government experts apparently misjudged the bomb-making capabilities of Saudi Arabian militants, assuming they could not build a bomb larger than a 200-pound device. (In fact, the bomb that exploded at Dhahran contained around 5,000 pounds of high explosive.) Air Force experts sent to Dhahran to improve the security environment after the Riyadh bombing did not recommend that the Dhahran base expand its eighty-foot perimeter. U.S. commanders in Dhahran decided not to appeal to the Pentagon for blast-resistant glass. Further, they chose not to press the Saudis to expand the defense system at the base. Finally, even though they believed that the base needed more defense, they failed to move soldiers away from the rooms and buildings that were in greatest danger. Chicago Tribune, Sept. 17, 1996.
34 "The Cracks in the Kingdom," The Economist, Mar. 18, 1995.
35 InterPress News Service, June 5, 1995.
36 FT Intelligence Asia Wire, May, 28, 1997.
37 The Economist, Apr. 25, 1998.
38 Peter Willems, "War Without End," The Middle East, Dec. 1996, p. 7.
39 Agence France Presse, Apr. 8, 1997.
40 FT Intelligence Asia Wire, May 28, 1997.
41 InterPress News Service, June 5, 1995.
Even those Americans who watch Saudi Arabia the most closely admit to being baffled by the country. Ronald Neumann, deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs admits that "we don't understand how the Saudis make decisions."1 Likewise, John Gannon, former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), acknowledges that his agency lacks intelligence on Saudi Arabia.2 As a result of these limitations, the U.S. government has been only moderately successful in assessing trends or predicting events in the kingdom.
How can the U.S. government—and other interested parties—improve their understanding of Saudi Arabia? One way is by developing a deeper appreciation of the role the religious establishment plays in the political decision-making process. To make this point, it is instructive to examine the role of the ulema (Islamic men of religion) in four key decisions: to institute the oil embargo following the Yom Kippur War of 1973, to allow U.S. troops onto Saudi soil in 1990 and then permit them to remain, and to support the Taliban since 1994.
The Saudi Ulema
Since the eighteenth century, the rulers of the Arabian Peninsula have shared power with their religious contemporaries, and this remains the case in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia today. While the monarch is technically the country's supreme religious leader and custodian of Islam's two holiest mosques at Mecca and Medina, in truth, he shares authority with a powerful group of spiritual leaders, the ulema. For nearly 300 years, the Al Saud has controlled the state while the Al ash-Sheikh,3 the descendants of Sheikh Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), has controlled the religious institutions. This cooperative and consensual relationship has provided the kingdom with one of the most stable societies in the region and has allowed it to avoid the war and revolution that has wracked nearly every one of its neighbors.In reaction to what he considered Islam's degeneration, Sheikh ‘Abd al-Wahhab founded what is generally known as Wahhabism, a movement based on a particularly strict interpretation of Islamic law. Among their many regulations, Wahhabis sought separation from non-Muslims; indeed, the strictest of them eschew all contact with Christians, Jews, or other infidels.4 The Saudi ulema today, as in the past, see themselves as guardians of this legacy.
While the ulema hold a variety of positions in Saudi institutions—they are judges (qadis), lawyers (muhama), and prayer leaders (imams)—only a few of them wield real power.5 Appointed by the king, these latter individuals staff several leading organizations.6
Lacking as they do formal control over policymaking, the power of the ulema is missed by many observers in the West, who mistakenly assume that their influence is limited to the religious sphere. In fact, the ulema exercise their sway in subtle, silent ways. While their input varies depending on the domestic circumstances and the strength of the Saud family, the king can never completely ignore them but must take their views into consideration in every choice he makes. The following four political decisions, which baffled many Western analysts at the time, become a bit clearer when the ulema are factored into Saudi decision-making.
I. Imposing an Oil Embargo
On October 6, 1973, the combined forces of Egypt and Syria simultaneously attacked Israel, much to Israeli (and American) surprise. While this oversight did not directly threaten U.S. interests, the Saudi decision to implement an oil embargo against the United States, coupled with a 10 percent production cut, deeply wounded the American economy.7 Despite repeated warnings by the Saudi government and the logic of the decision, the embargo met with surprise among the general populace and policymakers in the United States.8 Just two days earlier, for example, a New York Times headline captured the general sense of confidence: "Analysts Doubtful Major Oil Dislocations Loom."9 A better understanding of the religious establishment and its impact on policy formation would have helped to predict what did happen.The causes of the embargo can be traced to the Six-Day War of June 1967, when Israel won a devastating victory over the armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, occupying substantial territories. As late as October 1972, King Faysal dismissed the prospect of a boycott, saying that it was useless to talk about oil as an instrument of pressure against the U.S., indeed, that it was dangerous even to think along those lines.10 But by April 1973, the king began sending signals to the U.S. government that unless some progress was made with regard to Israel withdrawing from the lands it took in 1967, the Arabs would use their oil for political leverage.11 What he meant by this was not clear. At first, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Zaki Yamani merely argued that Saudi Arabia would not increase production.12 Then, on July 6, 1973, King Faysal announced that Saudi Arabia would like to continue friendly ties with the United States, but that this would be difficult unless the latter adopted a more even-handed policy in the region.13
As President Anwar as-Sadat of Egypt prepared to assault the Israeli lines along the Suez Canal in a bid to regain lost land, he visited King Faysal in August 1973 to discuss his plans and to win his support. The Saudi monarch quietly agreed to contribute $500 million to Egypt's war chest and to weigh in with the oil weapon.14 In September, Deputy Oil Minister Prince Saud al-Faysal stated that "Saudi Arabia is undoubtedly now prepared to use its key position as a major world supplier of crude oil to bring pressure on the U.S. government to moderate its pro-Israeli policy."15 The following chronology helps to understand the evolution of Saudi thinking after hostilities began on October 6:
October 7: The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) calls for an immediate halt to the pumping of all Arab oil;16 Saudi Arabia continues negotiations with Western oil companies; neither an embargo nor production cuts are mentioned by the Saudi government at this time or during the next week. October 17: A Kuwaiti-sponsored conference of Arab oil-producing countries agrees to a 5-percent cut in production each month until Arab demands are met. A proposal to impose a total embargo on the United States is set aside due to Saudi opposition.17 Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘Umar as-Saqqaf, meets with President Richard Nixon and calls the meeting "friendly and constructive."18In other words, King Faysal seems until the last minute to have been ambivalent about actually using the oil weapon, a step he took only on the evening of October 19.
October 18: The Saudis cut oil production by 10 percent; King Faysal's government says it will cut off all oil supplies to the United States if Washington continues aiding the Israeli armed forces.19
October 19: The Nixon administration asks Congress for $2.2 billion in aid for Israel.
October 20: Saudi Arabia implements a total oil embargo of the United States. The official announcement read: "In view of the increase in support for Israel, the Saudi Arabian Kingdom has decided to stop the export of oil to the United States of America for adopting such a stand."20
Much has been written about the change in policy between October 17 and October 20.21 At first glance, it would seem that the $2.2 billion appropriations bill was the deciding factor. Or was the embargo a fulfillment of King Faysal's promise to Sadat? In fact, neither of these factors fully explains the king's decision: he knew the United States was merely supplying the Israelis to counter similar efforts by the Soviets to supply the Egyptians; and if he was motivated primarily by a promise to Sadat, why did he wait until two weeks after the war had begun to implement the embargo?
Understanding Saudi decisions is never a simple matter. William Quandt of the University of Virginia lists nine separate factors to take into account when interpreting Saudi oil policy: market conditions, revenue requirements, technical problems, internal politics, expectations (of price, inflation rate, security of foreign investment, etc.), Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) pressures, associated gas needs, relations with the United States, and the Palestinian problem.22 While all of these factors are important, Quandt errs in not mentioning Saudi Arabia's religious responsibilities and the role of the ulema. This absence is indicative of American policy analysts' general misunderstanding and underestimation of the role these elements play in Saudi decision-making.
Pressure from the ulema (and the rapidly changing military situation in the war's
final days) helps to explain the Saudi government's decision to implement an oil embargo. This move accomplished two of the ulema's objectives: increasing the kingdom's stature as a leader in the Muslim world while distancing the country from the West. As a former senior official in the Saudi land forces told me, there was a tacit agreement between the king and the senior ulema along the following lines: if the war goes badly in Egypt, King Faysal would implement an oil embargo.
Specifically, Grand Mufti and Chief Qadi Sheikh Muhammad Al ash-Sheikh (born
ca. 1895), one of King Faysal's closest advisors, had great influence on the king's concept of his political role in the Arab world and Saudi Arabia's importance as guardian of Islam's holiest shrines and cities. Many observers attribute his influence to King Faysal's famous proclamation: "My dream is to pray in the morning in Mecca,
in the afternoon in Medina, and in the evening in Jerusalem—without ever leaving Arab land."23 This statement shows that King Faysal shared the ulema's devotion to the Palestinian cause and their strong objection to Israeli control of Jerusalem.
Yet the Saudi monarch realized that an embargo might hurt Saudi interests, knowing of the country's need for U.S. support. Also, he may have been worried about the long-term implications of the rise in oil prices that would accompany an embargo. These tensions exist during any period in which Arab-Islamic interests seriously conflict with U.S. interests: Saudis are at once fearful of Western secular contamination and acutely aware of its need for U.S. support. King Faysal had ample reason to be cautious in the use of the oil weapon and to delay its use as long as possible. He could afford to ignore the pressure from the ulema as long as the Egyptians seemed not to be losing the war. By October 19, however, news that the Egyptians faced a near total defeat reached the Saudi king, tilting the balance in favor of the ulema. The next day, he announced the embargo.
Thus, the Saudis implemented the embargo not primarily to fulfill a promise or a threat, nor to increase the price of oil, nor even as a weapon to help destroy Israel, but to satisfy the growing frustration of the ulema and preempt internal demands that the United States be punished for its role in the Israeli victory.24
The Ford administration could have better predicted the embargo had it kept in mind the unique balance Saudi leaders must make between secular and religious forces and the limitations that are imposed on them by their country's role as a leader of the Arab world. As is, the Americans did not fully understand the forces at work in the Saudi decision-making process; specifically, they lacked an appreciation of the Saudi monarch's religious responsibilities. Had they understood this more fully, they could have dealt more effectively with Riyadh, perhaps even avoiding the embargo. For instance, the U.S. government could more forcefully have announced its intention to secure a fair peace or even to work toward implementation of the spirit of U.N. Resolution 242 (returning Israel to its 1967 borders). Either of these moves would have given King Faysal more room to maneuver, while neither would have gone against U.S. policy (which was to support a limited but not total victory for the Israelis). In fact, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was en route to Moscow to discuss cease-fire terms when the embargo news hit, and even his travel itinerary might have been sufficient to prevent the Saudis from implementing the embargo.25
II. Inviting Foreign Troops
The special relationship between the kingdom and the United States was put to the test in August 1990, when Saddam Husayn's troops invaded Kuwait and began massing along the Saudi border, representing an immediate threat to the Saudi kingdom. The imminent threat meant that when King Fahd decided to invite in U.S., British, French, and other foreign troops, he gained the necessary consensus, which did indeed protect the kingdom. However, to maintain the consensus so vital to Saudi cohesion, it was necessary to make serious concessions to the ulema.When the U.S. government first offered troops in August 1990 to protect the kingdom and free Kuwait, its plans met with enormous domestic opposition. According to a highly-placed official, King Fahd called the ulema and senior members of the Sheikh family before making a decision. He raised with them the question of allowing foreign non-Muslim troops onto Saudi soil. At first, the idea met staunch opposition, with all the senior ulema categorically against the idea and refusing to consent to such a decision.
Only after long discussions with the king and other senior members of the royal family did the grand mufti, Sheikh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Baz, reluctantly endorse the idea, and even so only on condition that the government provide solid proof of a threat. It did, and the ulema relented in part because satellite images delivered by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and General Norman Schwartzkopf clearly showed thousands of Iraqi troops massed at the border. At the same time, reports from the Saudi armed forces inspired little confidence in the kingdom's ability to defend itself. King Fahd called together 350 Islamic leaders and scholars to Mecca to debate this topic. This effort resulted in the following edict (fatwa), issued by Sheikh bin Baz:
Even though the Americans are, in the conservative religious view, equivalent to non-believers as they are not Muslims, they deserve support because they are here to defend Islam.26But the ulema also extracted several agreements from King Fahd in exchange for their blessing. He had to offer assurances that non-Muslim troops would respect the traditions of the kingdom and that, once no longer needed, those troops would immediately leave.27 In particular, they won more authority for the Committee for the Prevention of Vice and Propagation of Virtue, better known as the morality police.28
The war against Iraq was won, to be sure, but it brought charges of dishonor that in a tribal society are not easily expunged. It also incurred the serious Islamic accusation of fitna—dissension, setting Muslim against Muslim. Years later, the king was still pondering his decision to invite in non-Muslim troops. "The Lord of glory and grandeur helped us with soldiers from all parts of the world," he told the Consultative Council. "Many said that the presence of foreign forces was wrong. But I say ... it was [a case of] extreme necessity."29
III. Hosting American Troops
The U.S. government also did not understand how the continued presence of American forces in Saudi Arabia after the end of hostilities in February 1992 would have a deeply insidious long-term significance. Again, this was because of an underestimation of the Saudi religious establishment and a failure to appreciate the hostility that foreign troops would create. Underestimating the extent of the dissatisfaction among the ulema and the religious establishment, the U.S. government grew complacent and kept troops in the country.The negative impact was not only long term and theoretical; the depth of these feelings were shown in the bombings that took place in Riyadh on November 13, 1995, at the Saudi National Guard communications complex, killing five American military trainers and two Indians; and in Dhahran on June 25, 1996, at the Khobar Towers, a U.S. military housing compound, killing nineteen American servicemen.
Had the Clinton administration paid more attention to the warning signs and had a better assessment of the extreme elements in the Saudi religious establishment, they might have better prepared for these assaults. Following the Kuwait war, most of the senior ulema resisted the presence of U.S. troops on Saudi soil, leading to an upsurge in anti-Western rhetoric. Many preachers built a following by specifically decrying the presence of foreign infidels and denouncing Saudi leaders for their dependence on the United States.30 The two most vocal of these were Sheikh Salman al-‘Awda and Sheikh Safar al-Hawali. The former compared members of the royal family to the last sultans of the Ottoman Empire and the Americans to an occupying force. His and other extremist groups gained enormous popular support through statements directly targeting U.S., French, and British troops. Significantly, he drew his support largely from Burayda, a town known as a bastion of Islamic extremism.
The government arrested the most disruptive of these individuals after the Kuwait war. When it detained Sheikh al-‘Awda in 1994, his followers took the dangerous step of intervening in an attempt to prevent him from losing his freedom; the sheikh's arrest only took place when he decided to go to the precinct with his followers, all of whom also turned themselves in to the police.31 All were placed under house arrest. His followers were released after several weeks but the sheikh remained under house arrest until June 1999.
Lapses in U.S. security at the base prior to the attack made things worse. After the Khobar explosion, the American task force studying the situation, headed by General Wayne Downing (former commander of the Special Operations Command), found many problems.32 The report cited no less than ten suspicious incidents in the ninety days before the attack. Despite the fact that Khobar Towers had been identified to Brigadier General Terry Schwalier, commander of the U.S. Air Force Squadron at the Dhahran airbase, as one of the three most likely targets in the area, he did not make counterterrorism a top priority there. Although Schwalier was the only American blamed for the bombings, the failure should be understood as a result of the general gaps in U.S. understanding of the Saudi situation, both military33 and political.34
IV. Supporting the Taliban
The Taliban came to power in Afghanistan assisted by resources and an ideology exported from Saudi Arabia and with training and money from the United States. The American goal in supporting Afghan fundamentalists during the 1980s had been to contain the Soviet Union; unexpectedly, this support also led to the establishment of a strict Islamic regime violently hostile to American interests.In the 1980s, the United States and Saudi Arabia both funded Afghanistan's mujahidin (warriors of jihad, or sacred war), rebels fighting Soviet troops backing the puppet regime in Kabul. Soon after the Soviets pulled out in 1989, an alliance of seven Islamic mujahidin parties defeated Najibullah, the leftist leader of the Soviet-backed regime. This alliance, however, quickly disintegrated, its members fighting among themselves.35 By mid-1994, the Taliban had emerged as a powerful new force and soon began to gain victories across the country. By mid-1999, they controlled some 90 percent of Afghanistan and may be on the verge of complete victory.
The Taliban have brought an end to the fighting in much of the countryside, but at a tremendous cost in human freedom. Their government has been criticized around the world for the human rights violations that spring from its purist interpretation of Islamic law. Women must wear a burqa, which covers nearly the entire body; they are not allowed to work or attend school and cannot leave their homes without a male guardian. Men must not shave. Music and television are forbidden. Punishments considered severe by Western standards are common and include the cutting off of the hands of thieves and the stoning to death of women found guilty of committing adultery.
The stunning success of the Taliban could not have happened without direct support from Pakistan and financial backing from Saudi Arabia.36 In addition, the U.S. government played an important role. A former high-ranking Pakistani civil servant with close ties to his country's intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), told me that "the U.S. provided the weapons and the know-how; the Saudis provided the funds; and we provided the training camps and operations bases for the mujahidin in the early 1980s, then for the Taliban." A senior Saudi military officer confirmed this: "The first government formed after the departure of the Soviets proved to be intractable; therefore, the Saudis and the United States chose the Taliban, with the firm belief that the Taliban would be able to take over the country." Henry Kissinger writes that although the U.S. and the Taliban had nothing in common, they shared a common enemy and that made them allies.37
The fundamentalist Taliban state now poses a threat to U.S. interests. First, it may well attempt to export its brand of fundamentalism to the neighboring states of Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. "Since we have lit the torch of truth in Afghanistan," said Haji Mawin, the Taliban's Supreme Council Vice-Chairman, "naturally it will light the torch in other countries."38
Second, the Taliban host Usama bin Ladin, the Saudi patron of fundamentalist Islamic movements. Though Saudi and U.S. intelligence fingered him as a suspect in the bombings of American targets in Saudi Arabia, Kenya, and Tanzania, the Taliban have shown little intention of expelling him (though they reportedly did urge him to end his support for terrorism).39
The U.S. government's policy analysis in Afghanistan was flawed; had it more clearly understood the nature of the Saudi religious establishment, it might have seen the warning signals sent off by Saudi support for the Taliban. An analysis of Saudi aid could have predicted the emergence of a threatening regime in Afghanistan. The origin of this support goes back to the early eighties, when the Saudi government provided backing to the mujahidin. By mid-1994, when the mujahidin had splintered, that support focused on the one element that had emerged from the disintegration: the Taliban.
While the kingdom's technical and financial support are well known, the religious elements are not. That the Taliban favors a brand of Sunni Islam close to the Wahhabi variant tends to confirm this connection.40 A high-ranking official in the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Guidance told me that once the Soviets were defeated, the Saudi ulema focused on funding and promoting the Taliban. The Taliban are largely composed of the children of Afghan refugees educated at Pakistani theological schools41 run by Pakistanis who received their degrees from Saudi Arabia and taught a strict form of Wahhabi theology and law. Far from being merely a recipient of Saudi aid and moral support, the Taliban are a creature of the kingdom.
Conclusion
American analysts have underestimated, overlooked, or misunderstood the nature, strength, and goals of the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia. This led to a failure to predict the oil embargo, the ferocity of anti-American sentiments after the Kuwait war, and to understand what the Taliban would become.This overly sanguine assessment of Wahhabism may result from the creed's relatively innocuous manifestation in contemporary Saudi Arabia. Aside from intermittent denunciations of America and nebulous links to terrorism, Wahhabis do not seem to represent a serious threat, especially when contrasted with the Iranian or Sudanese fundamentalists. This is largely due to their historic power-sharing relationship with the secular authorities, which dictates that the clergy in most cases defer to the government. However, government decisions can often be best understood with reference to the power of the ulema and from the conservative masses from which that power derives.
This misunderstanding has until now had only limited negative consequences for the United States, but miscalculations could prove far more dangerous in the coming years, as the kingdom enters a period of rapid and deep change. The government is likely to be challenged on public policy issues as the population quickly expands and oil revenues decrease. These developments will likely permit the religious establishment a louder voice in the consensual power sharing relationship in the kingdom. The Taliban government offers a chance to witness a Wahhabi-style government without the moderating presence of the Saud royal family; as such, it offers a possible glimpse of Saudi Arabia if the traditional balance of power is disrupted in favor of the religious establishment.
1 Interview with the author, Nov. 1997.
2 Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 17, 1997.
3 "Al" here is Arabic for "family," not "the."
4 Liesl Graz, The Turbulent Gulf (New York: St. Martins, 1992), p. 127.
5 Mordechai Abir, Saudi Arabia: Government, Society, and the Gulf Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 25.
6 Such as the Council of the Assembly of Senior Ulema (Majlis Hay'at Kibar al-‘Ulama'), the Higher Council of Qadis (Al-Majlis al-‘Ali li'l-Qada'), the morality police (known as the Mutwawa'in).
7 U.S. News and World Report, Oct. 24, 1983.
8 David Long, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997), p. 69.
9 Oct. 18, 1973.
10 David Golub, When Oil and Politics Mix: Saudi Oil Policy, 1973-1985 (Cambridge: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 1985), p. 8.
11 Long, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 69.
12 Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1985, p. 154.
13 Ibid., p. 155.
14 Ibid., p 156.
15 Golub, When Oil and Politics Mix, p. 71.
16 Ibid., p. 10.
17 Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security, p. 157.
18 Golub, When Oil and Politics Mix, p. 11.
19 The New York Times, Oct. 18, 1973.
20 Ibid., Oct. 21, 1973.
21 Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security, p. 155.
22 William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security and Oil (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982), pp. 126-128.
23 Benoist Mechin, Faiçal: Roi d'Arabie (Paris: Albin Michel, 1986), pp. 40-42.
24 Golub, When Oil and Politics Mix, p. 12.
25 Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security, p. 160.
26 Abir, Saudi Arabia: Government, Society, and the Gulf Crisis, p. 178.
27 Ibid.
28 Anthony Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997), p. 37.
29 The Economist, Mar. 18, 1995.
30 Chicago Tribune, Sept. 24, 1996.
31 "Revolt in Buraydah," videotape released by the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) in London, 1996.
32 The Downing Commission's main allegations concerned the insufficiency of the base security system: "leaders failed to provide clear standards, adequate funding and attention to protect American forces." Chicago Tribune, Sept. 17, 1996.
33 U.S. government experts apparently misjudged the bomb-making capabilities of Saudi Arabian militants, assuming they could not build a bomb larger than a 200-pound device. (In fact, the bomb that exploded at Dhahran contained around 5,000 pounds of high explosive.) Air Force experts sent to Dhahran to improve the security environment after the Riyadh bombing did not recommend that the Dhahran base expand its eighty-foot perimeter. U.S. commanders in Dhahran decided not to appeal to the Pentagon for blast-resistant glass. Further, they chose not to press the Saudis to expand the defense system at the base. Finally, even though they believed that the base needed more defense, they failed to move soldiers away from the rooms and buildings that were in greatest danger. Chicago Tribune, Sept. 17, 1996.
34 "The Cracks in the Kingdom," The Economist, Mar. 18, 1995.
35 InterPress News Service, June 5, 1995.
36 FT Intelligence Asia Wire, May, 28, 1997.
37 The Economist, Apr. 25, 1998.
38 Peter Willems, "War Without End," The Middle East, Dec. 1996, p. 7.
39 Agence France Presse, Apr. 8, 1997.
40 FT Intelligence Asia Wire, May 28, 1997.
41 InterPress News Service, June 5, 1995.
Related Topics: Radical Islam, Saudi Arabia | September 1999 MEQ receive the latest by email: subscribe to the free mef mailing list To receive the full, printed version of the Middle East Quarterly, please see details about an affordable subscription. This text may be reposted or forwarded so long as it is presented as an integral whole with complete information provided about its author, date, place of publication, and original URL.
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